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FOREWORD
Information Service for Officers was established by the Chief
of Naval Personnel in 1948. It contains lectures and articles of
professional interest to officers of the naval service.
The thoughts and opinions expressed in this publication are
those of the author and are not necessarily those of the Navy
Department or of the Naval War College.
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STRATEGIC EMPLOYMENT OF THE NAVY;
PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE
An address delivered by

'Vice Admiral Donald B. Beary, U.S.N.
at the National' War College
16 February, 1950

General Bull and Officers of the National War College, I

consider it a distinct honor to be invited to address such a highly

selected group of officers. I must admit, however, that I was some
what confounded when I received the suggested topic for my re
marks, which was "Strategic Employment of the Navy; Past,
Present and future". We have in our library many thousands of
volumes covering the subject and to think that I could summarize
them in a fifty minute talk is somewhat overcoming. However, i
will try to give some of the most important points, generally con
fining my remarks to World Wars I and II and future employment of
the Navy.

The basic fundamental mission of the Navy in the past and it
will continue to be so in the future is to gain and maintain con
trol of the sea lanes vital to our war effort and to deny to the en
emy the sea lanes vital to him.
By April 6, 1917, when we entered World War I, the Brit

ish Navy had contained, though not destroyed, the German surface
Navy, and our contribution to this containment was the sending of
the 6th Battleship Division to·augment the British fleet. Our prin
cipal effort was expended in combating the enemy submarines. You
all know the outcome. As far as the Navy was concerned, the war
was between surface and sub-surface craft. Shipborne air did not
enter into it.
Vice Admiral Be�ry is President of the Naval War College.
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During the period from the end of the war until. 1933 we
witnessed the rapid disintegration of our navy through armament

limitation agreements and drastic curtailment of funds. Ship con
struction practically ceased; research and development were seri
ously curtailed and non-existent in that m:ost important develop
ment which, though hampered by limited funds, made progress, and
in March 1922 we had our first aircraft carrier, the converted col:
lier, LANGLEY.

The period from 1933 to 1941, when we suddenly found our

selves in a war on two fronts, witnessed the slow but gradual build- .
up of our navy, including destroyers, cruisers, battleships and car
riers. The tempo increased with the rapid deterioration of the
world international situation until the Japs bombed Pearl Har
bor, when the sky was the limit.

Though the Navy suffered terrific losses at Pearl Harbor,
we were lucky 'in one respect and that was that not one of the
seven aircraft carriers in commission was damaged. W-e had been
knocked to our knees but were not out.
Our basic military strategy as approved by the President was

that initia�ly our major military effort would be made in the Euro
pean theater, while holding or defensive operations were con
ducted in the Pacific.

We had lost control of the seas. Our
Navy had been so seriously crippled and was so definitely inferior in
power to the Jap Navy that there was no other answer. There-·
fore, until the Navy could accomplish its mission of. regaining and

maintaining the control of the sea lanes essential to the conduct
of the war we had to assume a defensive position.

As in World War I by the time we entered the war the

British Fleet had contained the German surface Navy, which re

quired an all out effort on its part; therefore the Japanese Navy

2
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became our sole responsibility and we were not in a position to meet

it head on. The best we could do was to conduct a few raids, hit and

run operations.

However, the extremely rapid advance of the Japs south

ward through New Guinea and the Solomon Islands, which vitally

threatened our line of communications with Australia, forced us
to do something drastic to stop them.

This something was the Battle of the Coral Seas on the 7th

of May, 1942, followed by the Battle of Midway on June 4th, 1942,

We sustained losses in these two battles but the enemy was so

severely punished that her great superiority was reduced almost to
equality with us.

Our strength was growing rapidly.

New con

struction and trained personnel to man our ships and planes were

being produced at a rate the enemy could not equal.
our way to gaining control of the seas.

We were on

On August 7, 1942, we landed on Guadalcanal and, though
the fighting was bitter and we took heavy losses, we stuck.

The

southward movement of the Japs was stopped, and we were now in
a position to start the long drive to Tokyo.

The grand strategy for this campaign consisted of two major
efforts: 1st, a drive northward under command of General Mac
Arthur, through New Guinea to the Philippines; and 2nd, a drive
westward under Admiral Nimitz to Okinawa.

After these pre

liminary objectives were seized and consolidated they were to be the
jumping off places for the final assault on Japan.

Fortunately,

after we had seized them the Japanese sued for peace on August
15, 1945, and the final step, the invasion of Japan, was not neces

sary.
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The above plan of campaign required the use of. amphibious
operations on a scale never attempted before. The prerequisit�
for success of these operations was control of the vital sea lane�,
including control of the air over them. It required the accomplish�
ment of something which many people said could not be done and
that was that ship-based air power could not successfully �mbat
and neutralize shore-based air power. The Navy did it.
/

i

So much for the first part of the Navy's mission, that is, the
gaining of control of the sea lanes vital to ou.r efforts. How about '
the second part, that is, denying to the enemy the sea lanes vital
to hitn?
From December 7, 1941, until the end of the war our sub
marines did an outstanding job and accounted for the major effort
in this regard assisted by occasional air and surface raids. With our
seizure of the Philippines and Okinawa the long essential life line of
the Japanese to Malaya and Indonesia was cut and the Japanese
had lost the war through inability to support her military forces
and feed her people.
They started the war with about 7,000,000 tons of merchant
shipping. They captured and built about 3,000,000 tons during the
war, which gave them a total of about 10,000,000 tons. At war's
end they had only about 1,500,000 tons left and only 750,000 tons of
this was operable. There were only about 500,000 barrels of fuel
oil left in all Japan, so you can readily see how effectively we had
cut their vital sea lanes. As a matter of comparison our fast
carrier task force used as much as 140,000 barrels of fuel oil per
day. In other words, the Japanese had only three days supply of
oil left on VJ day based on our consumption rate.
This forcibly demonstrates that a nation's sea power is com
posed not only of her combatant ship strength but of equal im4
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol3/iss4/1
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portance is her merchant shipping.
regarded.

This fact is frequently dis

So much for our naval strategy during World War II in the
Pacific. Turning to the Atlantic, as I have said before, the Brit

ish had contained, though not destroyed, the German surface Navy
by the time we entered the war. The fight in that theatre was
against their submarines. It was a tough battle and at one time was
almost lost, but with the great improvement in detection devices,
the tremendous increase in the numbers of escort vessels, the in
troduction of "Hunter-Killer" tactics and more effective use of
land-based air, we, the British and ourselves, were able to suc
cessfully combat the German submarines and maintain control of
the seas.

The lesson we have learned from two world wars is that the
submarine is a most important threat to our control of the seas,
and that the introduction of faster under-water speeds and ability
to run submerged for long periods of time have greatly increased
the difficulties of successfully combating them. In my opinion it
is the most important problem that confronts the Navy. It is one
which must be solved and will require all the brains, talent and
money we can get to solve it. I will refer to this later.

So much for the strategy and mission of the Navy during

the past two great wars.
our Navy?

What about the future employment of

There is a vociferous, fanatical group of people in this

country, who unfortunately receive more attention than their cause

deserves, who say that air power has sunk the Navy and ships that
sail on the surface of the seas. This is not true and all history re

futes it. Some of these same fanatics say, "We don't care any
thing about history; we make it." I cannot believe that any sound,
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logical, sane, educated person would make such a statement or be,.
lieve such a thing.
All progress that man has madein whatever form of�science,
engineering, art, living, government, etc., is a direct result of past
trials and.errors and·suceesses. Naval science is no exception. The
wise man learns and profits from the past and applies his knowledge
to the present and the future.
The end of World War II brought about a situation in
naval affairs that had its most recent parallel during the Napoleonic
Wars. At that time Napoleon had organized the States of West
ern Europe jnto a continental alliance that was opposed by a single
dominant sea power-Great Britain. After the defeat of the Com
bined Fleet at Trafalgar, Europe faced a long period during which
the naval strength of the continental powers could be employed
only in the ''guerre de course"-war upon commerce.i The "guerre
de course" is the classic weapon of the weaker sea power, but it
will not win wars. After Trafalgar, England bottled up what was
left of. the French Fleet in its home ports by means· of blockade,
and her sea power was opposed only by such scattered forces as
were able to skirt the blockade and prey on British merchant ship
ping. Thus, absolute sea power, in a manner of speaking, was op
posed to absolute land power. But the dominant sea power was
without the physical means to settle the issue on the, continent;
she lacked the resources in -fuen and material necessary . to prose
cute land warfare on a large scale. And her continental adversary
could not bring to bear against her its vast resources in land
strength so long as it lacked sea power.
Thereafter, Great Britain recognized it as her cardinal pol
icy to pr�vent the rise on the continent of a single dominant power
that might some day utilize the far greater resources of Europe
to outbuild · her at sea. Britain steadfastly pursued this policy
6
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right up until World War II, employing the weight of her in
fluence and the pressure of her sea power to intervene in Europe
and so preserve the balance of power on the Continent.
Today, the cycle has reached full turn. A single con
tinental power has arisen in Europe that threatens to exclude the
Western democracies from the Eurasian Continent. That power

is opposed by a complex of States that rim the Atlantic Ocean. The
backbone of that complex is the sea power of Great Britain and the
United States, upon which all the rest depends. Except for its sub
marine arm--of which more later-the naval strength of the con
tinental power is not great enough to make a serious bid for com
mand of the seas.

This state of affairs has created in the minds of many per
sons a dangerous misconception-some of whom, indeed, may be

responsible for the formulation of our national strategy.

That

misconception is that sea power cannot be fully effective unless it is
opposed by sea power, weapon for weapon. The belief is widely
held that if the Soviets do not have capital ships, then we do not
need them; if they lack the striking power of carrier air, then

this weapon has no place in our arsenal; and that it is sufficient
simply to counter our opponent where he can strike us at sea,
namely, by defeating his submarine fleet.

truth.

I assure you, gentlemen, nothing could be farther from the
As I have said before, the Mission of the Navy in war can

be reduced to a very plain statement:

to make safe for our use the
sea lanes we need and to deny to the enemy the sea lanes he must
use to fight the war against us. Out of this simple Mission grows

a multitude of tasks that require the use of many weapons. i:t will

be my purpose here to state those tasks to you and to demonstrate
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how the Navy can-and, I trust, will-carry out those tasks jf an
other war is forced upon us.
It is helpful, I think, when reviewing our overall strategic
situation, to hold in mind a polar projection of the northern hemis
phere centered somewhere near Moscow. The European penin
sula is adjacent on the north, west, and south to waters of the At
lantic, or waters tributary to it. To the southward of the Eura
sian land mass, the Persian Gulf knifes in from the Indian Ocean
to a point within a thousand air miles of Soviet industrial centers
in the Caucausus and on the Caspian Sea. To the east, Siberia and
China front the Pacific Ocean. Wherever the coasts of Europe and
Asia meet the sea, Soviet power stops and ours begins. Thanks to
Anglo-American sea-air power, the broad surface of the seas is
denied to the enemy and is open to our use so long as we are able
to defend our shipping from the enemy's submarines and his
land-based air.
At the present time, as you well know, we hold important
strategic positions around the Eurasian continent from which our
military strength could be projected against the Soviet Union. At
the outset of any war, we shall hold an important lodgment in
Western Europe. Whether we can successfully maintain a foot
hold on the continent of Europe against the full weight of Soviet
land power must, of course, be determined by the event. We
believe that we can do so; and we are making heavy investments in
the Atlantic Pact nations to make that expectation a reality.
Outside the continental limits of Europe and Asia, we are estab
lished in the British Isles, in other islands of the Atlantic, in
north and east Africa, and at scattered points along the fringes
of central and southeast Asia. We face the Soviets in eastern
Asia and in the Japanese Islands and Okinawa.
8
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Thus, the entire Eurasian land mass is ringed by a serie-J
of positions from which heavy blows could be directed anywhere
against objectives on the Continent. In this situation there is dem
onstrated the classic weakness of a strong land power opposed by a
sea power having limited land strength. The land power cannot
invade the territory of its opponent since it cannot transport its
ground forces overseas. Although it may strike its enemy through
the air, and indeed deal him fearsome blows, it cannot make their
final by the ultimate invasion of his homeland. When ranged
against a strong sea power, the land power can gain at the most
only a stalemate. With this it must be content, since the oceans re
main an effective barrier against the movement of troops in great
force.
Not so, the sea power. The flexibility of action that is af
forded by control of the seas permits the sea power to deliver its
main thrust--or a series of thrusts-from any direction. The
enemy cannot be strong everywhere, and he cannot know forcer
tain from whence the blow may fall. By the economy of the
limited force that is available to it, the power that commands the
sea can direct that force so as to obtain its maximum effect.
These principles apply whether the force used be strictly
carrier strikes on coastal objectives, long-range strategic air at
tacks from peripheral bases, or amphibious invasion. Although
the continental power retains the advantage of interior lines, they
may prove of little value if its forces are over-extended and cannot
be transported in time to meet the threatened attack.
It would seem, therefore, that our basic strategy, in the case
of a war against the Soviets, would be to preserve the sort of a
condition I have just described. If we are ultimately to inter
vene with ground troops on the continent of Europe-and it appears
inevitable that we would have to do so-then such an intervenRESTRICTED
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 1950
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tion should be made only after the enemy has been seriously w�kened by blows delivered with sea and air weapons from peripheral
bases.
It would be unwise to the point of folly, however, to assume
that such a strategy is not apparent to our opponent or that, he
will not do everything in his power to nullify it, if and when he,
cides upon war. Having recognized that strategic air attacks m�y
be carried out from advanced Allied positions against his in
dustry and communications, it may well be that the enemy's first
move in the event of war will be to capture or neutralize these
positions.

�r .

This, he has the capability of doing. True enough, the
Soviets could neither hold nor support overseas positions in _the
face of the pressure we could ultimately bring against their com
munications, but, for a time, an initial move of this sort might
have desirable effects. Such an opening move could conceivably
take the form of an. atomic blitz against Britain, coupled with air
borne and air-supported attacks on Iceland and our North AfriGan
positions. In such a case, the effect of any pla:qned retaliatory blow
would be seriously reduced. We would be for�ed to rely on North
American bases and such advanced bases as we might continue
to hold for the support of an initial strategic bomber offensive.
Thereafter, we would be faced with a long, uphill pull to re-estab
lish our forces at locations close enough to enemy targets to make
the employment of our air power both effective and profitable.
It will be clearly apparent to you that the support and reten
tion of overseas bases will depend upon the ability of the fleet to
keep open the lines of communications with those bases. The en
emy will have at his disposal two primary weapons to prevent
our doing so. One of these is the submarine; the other is land-based
10
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol3/iss4/1

RESTRICTED
14

Naval War College: April 1950 Full Issue

RESTRICTED
air, where it can be brought within range of the sea routes our

ships must use.

As to the submarine, it is gratifying to observe the attention

that is now being given to that problem and to note the agreement
so widely reached that we must make a major effort toward its
solution.

Although I am unable to say to you that any final solu

tion is as yet in sight, the means of detection and the weapons
for use against the submarine are well in advance of those available

at the end of the last war.

There is a tendency, I fear, on the part of the public-and

some members of the military-to over-emphasize the potentialities

of the submarine and to overlook some basic disadvantages attend

ant on its use as a primary weapon in the war at sea.

The submarine is, fundamentally, a weapon of the "guerre

de course".

Commerce raiding has held a fascination for weaker

naval powers throughout the history of naval warfare because of
its cheapness.

But it has never decided the issue in a major war.

The British tried it themselves in the Anglo-Dutch War, when

Charles II sought to gain a cheap victory over the Dutch and their
French allies by preying on their commerce.

This war ended, how

ever, with a fleet of Dutch ships in the mouth of the Thames.

During the war of the Spanish succession, the French devoted all

their efforts at sea to the raiding of British commerce.

Although

the British lost hundreds of ships, their trade increased neverthe

less, and French shipping all but disappeared from the seas. Mahan
roundly condemned commerce raiding as a poor substitute for
fleet action.

His studious disciples, the Germans, placed primary

reliance upon it as a means of naval warfare in both World Wars.

Today, we have not yet found completely satisfactory meth

ods of combating the most advanced types of submarines.

RESTRICTED
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is by no means clear that the Soviets will be able to employ them
effectively against the opposition that even now we are able to
offer.
The task of the submarines has been greatly complicated
by new developments. As you know, the Germans found it neces
sary to give their submarine crews long and intensive training
periods in the Baltic in order to fit them for warfare against our

convoys in the Atlantic. The shortening of their training periods,
enforced upon the Germans during the latter stages of the war,
was a great source of apprehension to Admiral Doenitz. The sub
marine that we shall combat in the next war will require of its
crews even greater technical proficiency than was attained by our
recent enemies in the last. Whether or not they are capable of
attaining this skill only time will tell. We should not discount it
too much.

So far, we have developed no acceptable substitute for the con
voy nor for the "hunter-killer" tactics so effectively employed toward
the end of the last war. We have, however, improved both our
weapons and our techniques in the prosecution of these methods of
anti-submarine defense. And other methods now under research
and development give even greater promise of a final answer to the
submarine problem.

But convoy and passive protection of shipping alone is not
enough. In the first instance, it surrenders to the enemy the initia
tive and leaves him free to devise new methods of attack when old
ones have failed. In the second, it forces upon us the need to pro

vide shipping with greater and greater protection as enemy offen
sive measures become more effective. And, finally, it permits the
enemy to increase the size of his concentrations against us, since
passive defense has no effect on his ability to build more sub

marines.

12
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Therefore, as a corollary to convoy and "hunter-killer" cover,
we must take up the offensive against enemy submari�es before they
leave their ports. We have numerous means of doing this. Many
of them lie within the sphere of strategic bombing-particularly
those that embrace attacks on building and assembly yards. But as
the finished product nears the sea-when the fitting out and train
ing stage commences-then, it may be within the power of the
fleet to intervene.
We shall seek to prevent the enemy from testing his boats
and training his crews in sea areas that are adj.acent to the oceans.
We shall mine his harbors and their exits, both by aerial and
submarine laid mines. And we shall attack him from the air
while his undersea craft are still in their pens. All of these are
measures that not only may require the mobility and striking pow
er of shipborne air, but are measures also to which it is especially
adapted. It would, of course, be a mistaken and uneconomical use
of sea-air power to carry out an offensive of this nature where en
emy training areas, harbors, and bases are within the effective
cover of land-based air. But in regions inaccessible to land-based
aircraft capable of precision attack missions of this kind, aircraft
from carriers may well be th_e only weapon that can do the job.
As to the enemy's land-based air, we can expect it will be
employed against our merchantmen much the same as it was in
the last war. The Germans used long-range reconnaissance aircraft
to locate convoys at sea. When a convoy was found, the position
would be relayed by radio to submarines best disposed to attack.
Thus, it would seem that some form of aerial reconnaissance will be
necessary if Soviet submarines are to be employed advantageously.
This means we shall have to screen our convoys against being
scouted by the enemy's land-based air. It will not be an easy job
to do. Limited, close-in screening can be carried out from escort
RESTRICTED
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carriers, but, in view of the enemy's ability to install radar in his
scouting aircraft, it is highly doubtful if we will be able to conceal the location of our convoys.
An obvious alternative would be to destroy the) Ememy's re
connaissance aircraft at its coastal bases. In some instances, it
should be possible to do this by land-based air strikes, provided
their are friendly fields within range. Elsewhere, fast carrier task
force strikes will be the only means of getting at these air�raft. On
the whole, the maintenance of absolute control of the �ir above
convoy routes will be a .difficult task to accomplish because of the
inordinate effort required to screen shipping again�t lqi:tg-range
reconnaissance aircraft. It should be possible, however, to de
fend merchant convoys against direct attack by land-based planes
by the provision of escort carriers in waters where danger of en
emy air attack exists. In the narrow seas, withi:ri close range of
enemy air bases, heavy covering forces consisting of carriers and
gunfire ships will doubtless be required to fight the convoys through.
Our experience in the Mediterranean during the last war indicates,
however, that merchant convoys can be moved ih the presence of
strong land-based air, provided carrier-borne aircraft is supplied in
adequate strength.
This leads us to a consideration of the carrier task force as
the primary weapon of naval warfare. As you know, the fleet ac
tions of Midway and the Coral Sea marked the beginning of a new
era in naval warfare and confirmed the aircraft carrier as the real
capital ship of the future. It is the most powerful offensive weapon
we have. The big-gun ship has now assumed primarily the status
of a surface escort for the carrier, although it has other uses. As
the war in the Pacific progressed, the striking power of carrier
aircraft against objectives other than enemy fleets was forcibly
demonstrated. Indeed, so effective did carriers prove in securing

14
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local control of the air at heavily defended land targets that surface
operations until then conceived as impracticable were confidently
planned and successfully carried out.
The aircraft carrier derives its value from a number of tacti
cal qualities, but it possesses one feature that transcends all the
others: It is a mobile base that can be brought close enough to
enemy targets. to launch aircraft with their optimum fighting ca
pabilities unimpaired. Of course, the fact that carriers may be
concentrated, and thus multiply their effectiveness; that they may
be employed with surprise; that they may cruise for long periods
in distant waters; and that they have great flexibility as to the
targets against which they may be employed; all these, too, are
important. But the ability to operate aircraft at short ranges
which the carrier imparts-is the unique feature that is unmatched
in any other weapon of aerial warfare. The carrier sends up an
aircraft with a minimum fuel load compared to that of land planes
that must be launched from more distant bases. Hence, it can
devote a greater portion of its carrying capacity to offensive and
defensive weapons, and it can be employed with greater frequency
since it has a shorter distance to fly. These advantages combine to
increase the striking power of carrier aircraft, not directly with
the decrease in range to the target, but more on the order of a
geometrical proportion with the decrease in range.
All of these tactical features add up to provide for Allied
sea-air power a strategic advantage that cannot be offset by its
opponent. By means of air-sea task forces employed in adequate
strength, we should be able to overwhelm the enemy at any
point within reach of our carrier-borne aircraft. It is this ability
that has in the past permitted us to paralyze enemy defenses at
the end of a long overseas movement of amphibious forces. It is
this ability which, I trust, will in the future permit the support
RESTRICTED
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and retention of overseas positions we may need to drive the war
home to the enemy.
I think we may accept it as a sound military principle
that when one component of the nation's armed force has been as
signed a specific task, it should be free to investigate the nature
of that task against the background of its own peculiar talents and
experience. Only by this means will it be able competently to de
termine how best to do the job it has been given.
Now, the Navy has been allocated those tasks that require
the use of weapons peculiar to sea-air power. Nobody disputes
that. These tasks do not involve the direct participation of any
other service. One of them is to employ the striking power of
carrier-based air against certain enemy targets that can be
reached from the sea. Accordingly, the Navy has put its best
brains and its most experienced officers to work on the problem of
how most effectively to employ carrier-based air against the op
position we may expect in the future. This is a technical problem

that requires solution by persons who are by training and ex
perience intimately acquainted with all the factors involved. I think
you will agree that such knowledge and experience can best be ob

tained from within the Navy itself.

Briefly stated, it has been the result of the Navy's investi

gation of this problem that we cannot expect to overcome deter
mined opposition at all enemy targets that are vulnerable to sea

air attack unless we employ the most advanced types of aircraft
that are available to us. We are aware of developments in Soviet

aviation and along other lines of anti-aircraft defense. There can
be 110 doubt these measures would have a high degree of effect
iveness against the aircraft for which our present carriers were

built.
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But we, too, have made corresponding advances in the art
of aircraft design and construction. We can build planes today
that we believe will out-perform anything the Soviets will have
in the foreseea}?le future. These are the planes we will, need if
we are successfully to exploit the unique weapon of sea-air power.
Unfortunately, we cannot adapt our present-day carriers
which, as you know, were designed under conditions of the last

war-to the new high-performance aircraft without sacrificing some
of their most valuable performance qualities. The Navy should
be free to build the carriers it needs to carry and operate the planes
necessary for it to carry out.its mission.
We must, I feel, remain keenly alert to changing tactical
and technological conditions that dictate changes in strategic con
cepts. Hardly a month passed during the last war but what some
naval developnient, however minor, contributed its small influence
to large revisions in our strategic thinking.

One of the most · significant of these developments was the
operation of carrier task forces relatively independent of forward

bases. In past wars, the radius of action of naval forces was de
termined by the availability of bases-or at least of coaling sta
tions-in advanced areas where the fleet sought to operate. Bases
have traditionally been one of· the essential components since

fleets acquired freedom of mobility with the advent of steam. The
sea power of Great Britain was magnified an<l reinforced by heP
numerous naval stations in all the oceans of the world. Th.ese
bases made it possible for Britain to extend the range of her
. fleets; and they, in turn, depended on the Fleet for security and
protection against overseas attack. Until World War II, it was ac
cepted as axiomatic by naval strategists that no nation could aspire
to control of sea areas far distant from the homeland unless she
had access to bases in waters where the fleet was to, be employed;
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Today, that is changed. In World War II, we were faced;with
a situation in the Pacific that threatened severely to limit ,�he
striking power of the naval weapon. We lacked· bases in waters
where we hadto carry the fight to the enemy. So we made our bases
mobile, and we took them where we pleased. As a result, our fleets
are today virtually independent of overseas bases. The flexibility
of the sea�air weapon has been multiplied, and for limited periods

we are able to bring to bear the full striking power of the Fleet in
waters wherever ships can sail.

The strategic implications of this naval development I ani
sure are not lost on you. What we are now able to -do is to bring to
bear the full strength of our sea-air power where and when we wish
and to maintain the pressure for prolonged periods of time.

Of course, advanced bases still are of great value. They
serve two main purposes. First, we need locations in forward areas
where we can send ships for repair of battle damage that would
otherwise require a long trip to shipyards in the rear, !:1-nd we need
them also to patch up heavily damaged ships so that the voyage
home may be made in safety. Secondly, we need advanced ports
where stores and ammunition can be transferred from incoming
cargo ships to the specially constructed logistics ships that. work in
the fleet. But neither of these functions requires an establishment
on shore. The facilities needed for the operation of an advanced base,
including major ship repair, may be entirely waterborne. Thus,
any protected anchorage favorably situated with respect to the zone
of combat may be placed into use as a floating base just as soon
as the specialized logistics ships can be brought forward.

Now, before closing, I want to touch briefly on the atomic
bomb and what it means to the future of naval warfare. I think

it is safe to say that nuclear fission has had an impact on existing
theories of warfare more severe than any other new weapon in his-
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tory. It has radically disturbed our pre-conceived notions involving
the disposition of forces and the principles of concentration and
mass. Paradoxically enough, we, who first developed the bomb,
have suffered most by the upsets it has produced in the technique
of warfare.
Our military experience in World War II was gained at
enormous cost. In the field of naval warfare, we 'battled our way
slowly and painfully from Pearl Harbor to Okinawa, meanwhile
gai_ning a "know-how" in the use of naval weapons that is un
matched by any nation in the world. But at the very end of the
war a new, more powerful weapon appeared that now threatens
to undo much of what we have learned.
The influence atomic weapons will have on maritime strategy,
however, is not yet clearly defined. For the present, we must ad
just ourselves to this situation just as we have in the past, when
�ew means of attack have seemed to render obsolete ships and
weapons then . in use. Naval· history is replete with instances
where some new weapan has threatened to make the ship no long
er an effective instrument for controlling the seas. When the ex
plosive shell supplanted a solid shot for use against the wooden man
of-war, . pessimistic observers were convinced great ships could
never stand up against this. terrible new weapon. But shortly
afterward, the ironclad ship made its appearance; and sea control
continued to be exercised, as U�\lal, by the · Power having the
largest fleet of heavy ships. When the Whitehead torpedo was
introduced, it seemed evident the death of the capital ship was
at hand. So convinced were the French of this fact that they
temporarily gave up the building of large ships in favor o� small
torpedo boats, each able to launch a lethal attack upon a battle
ship. But it turned out that these small craft could reach their
targets only under favorable conditions of sea and weather, and
RESTRICTED
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that they were highly vulnerable to the defensive fire of their
ponderous opponents. Moreover, improvements in underwater pro
tection tended to redress the balance in favor of the ship. With
the advent of the airplane, it appeared certain to most advocates

of air power that large ships would become easy prey to aircraft
able to launch against them bombs weighing five hundred or a
thousand pounds. Instead, the present day capital ship-with its

powerful anti-aircraft weapons, under radar control and firing in

fluence-fuzed shells augmented by its own air coverage-has be
come an extremely tough target, even to large flights of aircraft.
And so it goes.

I think the lesson to be learned here was

best expressed by Mahan when he cautioned against being too

quick in discarding the old as well as too slow in adopting the new.

We know, of course, that a single atomic bomb will destroy

a single ship. But we know also that fighting ships underway and

suitably dispersed will suffer but slightly from an atomic explosion,
except by direct hit.

This would seem to make the use of atomic

bombs against mobile forces extremely doubtful.

On the other hand, heavy concentration of ships in ports or

amphibious operations might offer suitable and worthwhile targets.
The present answer seems to be greater dispersion and control of
the air over the vital areas.

It

is not beyond reason that we shall

in the future evolve a defense against the atomic bomb that will

prove effective.

Now as to push button warfare, including rockets, jet pro

pelled bombs, guided missiles, etc., fortunately, the solution of that

problem seems very remote. At best they probably will never be pre

cision weapons and whether or not they will be used against mo
bile naval forces is problematical. As you know, counter measures
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are being devised but have not yet been overly successful. It is a
problem which is of vital importance to all the armed services.
In conclusion, gentlemen, if there is one single thought I
should like to leave with you, it is this: Command of the sea is

vital to us in war. I think that summarizes all I have- had to say.
Unless we have command of the sea, our war-making force must re

main based within our continental borders. Without it, we cannot

support our allies, and we shall be left to face the enemy alone.

It is the job of the Navy to provide that command. The
Navy by itself cannot win a war. But the Navy alone can create
conditions without which victory cannot be possible.
Those
conditions are these: to make safe for our use the sea lanes we

-need and to deny to the enemy the S!ea lanes he must use to
fight the war against us.
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CAPABILITIES OF THE ATOMIC BOMB, INCLUDING
NAVAL THINKING ON ITS EMPLOYMENT
Extracts from a Lecture by
S. Parsons, U.S.N.
at the Naval War College
February 16, 1950

Rear Admiral W.

My lecture is supposed to be about naval thinking on the em
ployment of the atomic bomb. I find difficulty in separating naval
thinking from military thinking and national thinking in this case.
I don't think that you can draw any sharp or beneficial distinction
between them. They necessarily interact on each other and are
included under this heading of national thinking.

It

is necessary even to go into what we mean by thinking
itself. I have been impressed by the type of thinking which has
gone on since 1945. I've followed it rather carefully, and I have
been affected by it. I think the term "visceral thinking" applies
to quite a lot that has been done since 1945. There are inarticu
late visceral thinkers, who take a set of facts and draw some most
remarkable conclusions from them. The inarticulate visceral

thinkers are of the type who do not pay much attention to news

papers and radio programs.
we call propaganda.

They are almost impervious to what

They are also inarticulate because they don't

read much and certainly wouldn't think of writing very much.

Those people take a set of bare facts such as these : "We had to

land in Normandy; we had done a lot of bombing; in spite of that
we had to march through on the ground.

But when we dropped

two atomic bombs on Japan they surrendered." That's all they think
Admiral Parsons is presently on duty with the Weapons System
Evaluation Group, Office of the Secretary of Defense. He has been
associated with the atomic bomb project since 1943 and was bomb
commander at the Hiroshima bombing.
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of, and then don't analyze it at all. That, I think, is behind a great

deal of the terrific worry and pressure which has prodded and
harassed the Atomic Energy Commission and has maintained the

atomic energy program. That is plain reflex-deduction from a set
of facts without any critical appraisal of those facts, what went be

hind them, or anything else. Their conclusions are drawn: "A sur
render of Japan occurred after two atomic bombs were dropped. A

surrender did not occur in Europe because atomic bombs were not

used."

The articulate thinkers, including some atomic· scientists for

the first several years during the pre-Blackett era of articulate
thinkers, created the concept of the "absolute weapon." They
were using "visceral thinking" but they were rationalizing and

dressing it up in very impressive language. That concept of the
"absolute weapon" was still obtaining in full force when I spoke here

in September, 1948. I found it necessary to go into it, to go into its
expression, its impact on concepts which were being reported as
war plans, and I had to work it over rather thoroughly. Then within
three weeks, Dr. Blackett's book came out. The British edition
that came out first, was called "Military and Political Consequences
of Atomic Energy." The American edition was titled "Fear,
War and the Bomb." The book is a most remarkable analysis. I
would say it is by far the best presentation. in English, of the
Russian point of yiew. It really sharpened the issues in this case
and it was a terrific shock to many of our highest-powered scientists
who had been associated with radar, atomic-energy development,
proximity fuse development, and had seen their work bear fruit in

important military consequences during the war. Dr. Blackett had

received the American Medal for Merit for his very fine work in

anti-submarine operations analysis during the war. He was -given

similar decorations in England, I believe.
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lished he also received the Nobel Prize for his work, beginning in

the early twenties, in nuclear physics. Doctor Blackett had been an

officer in the Royal Navy during World War I.
into physics.

He had then gone

He had about the best mental equipment for opera

tions analysis and scientific military appraisal of any scientist of his
time.

That was quite a shock, as I say, to our scientists who had

thought that their analyses of military consequences and military

tactics should be absolutely sound because they had used scientific

methods in producing them. This was a demonstration, by one of

the best equipped, best thinkers among physicists and scientists in

general, that you could take a set of facts, that you could handle

them in apparently scientific fashion and you could prove practically

anything that your apparent religion and philosophy demanded to

be proved, and do it, not in Russia, but right in England, using the
accepted terminologies and accepted operations research methods.

It was a terrible blow to our Operations Analysts and other

scientists in the United States to have one of their most eminent
members write this book. That was independent of the impact of
the book itself.

I have just given the impact on the scientists.

The book probably had a beneficial effect in many ways, because

it sharpened the issues and caused people to re-examine the facts

to see how Blackett could be combatted.

That was the beginning

of a new era in the articulate arguments on atomic energy and
its military consequences.

That illustrates to me a very necessary thing in working over

facts, particularly intelligence observations and in thinking of what
Russia, for instance, can do under certain conditions.

To go back

to Ptolemy and Copernicus, you can say that imagining the sun and

the stars as revolving around the earth because it "looked that

way" was an example of "visceral thinking" which was dignified

by some of the best so-called scientists for hundreds of years.
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accurate, correct interpretation had to be fought over for just that
length of time before people would actually look at this set of
facts and derive the correct conclusion from them.
I will now mention another recent shock. We operated un
der a semi-dictatorship in World War Two. We had absolute

priority of effort, and we got results like the Manhattan District,
production of aircraft and production of fleets. We then demob
ilized and concentrated on automobiles, television and like things.

But we forgot that Russia had not demobilized and was still op
erating under a dictatorship more rigid and perhaps as dynamic as
the one that we had operated under in World War Two. We did not

take account of certain little red flags that were flying. I'm lead
ing up to this shock that we experienced when the announcement
came out on the 23rd of September about a Russian atomic ex

plosion. We were quite shocked. But if we had thought of Cf'l'
tain things which had occurred, such as the obvious flying around
of wing jet fighters and many copies of our B-29, when we knew
how hard it had been for us to put anything like that number into

the air, we would have been less shocked.

Those red flags indi

cated that regardless of how inefficiently rail transportation and

various other routine operations were carried out in Russia, when

they assigned top priority to a job, it really rolled.

That made it

not too much of a shock to some of us who had been observing

those red flags flying.

But indicates the kind of trap into which

we can fall when we sit in one type of organization, one type of

climate, one type of pressure and try to estimate what someone

else is going to do, living under a completely different system with
uifferent motivations.

That leads me into one or two final points.

I was very

much impressed with the talk General Marshall gave this week
at the National War College.

I'll mention just one of his points.
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He was commenting on the old Army War College, but I think his

remarks applied to war colleges in general. He said that it is very
necessary to be as concrete as possible in plans and to get away as

far as we can from purely abstract statements. He warned that

the difficulties we had had with Army War College Command and

Staff schools and staff people, were their tendency to deal in the

abstract rather than the concrete. He gave an illustration occurring

at an early peak of activity, say in 1939, '40 and '41, when he, as

Chief of Staff, and as Deputy Chief of Staff before that, was fac:
ing concrete problems not very far away from the Army War
College.

They were taking it very easy with their two-week man

euver, or whatever it was called. He said that he would like to ex
pose them to some of the real facts of life, and the way it would oc
cur would be this: They would be given two-thirds of the neces
sary information for working out a problem on Saturday noon;
they would work over the week-end at highest pressure on those two
thirds of the problem; on Monday, they would be given the missing
third which showed that they would have to throw all their work
over the week-end into the waste-basket; on Tuesday the rules
would be changed, and on Thursday the whole solution would be
thrown out.

Citing the need for realism and concreteness does not imply
ability to predict events. Dr. Isaiah Bowman, retiring president of
Johns Hopkins made a pertinent comment when we asked him how

he had made such very good predictions of events to come. In the

last fifteen years, he has been credited with having hit the nail on
the head with many of them. In denying this ability he said, "I

don't think that it is possible for anyone to predict in detail what
will happen.

The actual event depends too much on pure accident

and the personalities of people involved."
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lessons of history, and get some reassurance from them with res
pect to the probability of the human getting permanently or too
tragically out of control.
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TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT CONTROL
A lecture delivered by

Rear Admiral George W. Baurenschmidt, U.S.N.
at the Naval War Colle�
February 16, 1950

In the last war production as a problem was solved very
early, but the problem of distribution was not solved. Transporta

tion is a major component of distribution. Traffic management
is a major component of transportation. My subject today is

"Traffic Management." But it cannot be discussed without a dis
cussion first of transportation as it pertains to logistics.
We are. accustomed to thinking of war in terms of fighting,

but you here at the Logistics Course of the War College must by
now recognize that the major part of modern war is logistics, and
transportation is a big part of logistics. The statistics of trans

portation in the Second World War are impressive and colossal.
Cargo and passenger ships outnumbered fighting ships many
times over. The Army, which depended almost entirely on truck
transportation in the European theater, had 30,000 men just op
erating railroads in that theater. The tonnage hauled away from
the United States for the war effort can be represented as half a

thousand billion ton miles, while inside the United States the
railroads alone in one year hauled three quarters of a thousand

billion ton miles. The Navy each day during the war turned over to

carriers in the United States an average of 100,000 tons of material.

These statistics are not only colossal, they are beyond comprehen

sion just as is the National debt, which, in no small part, represents
transportation costs.

I cannot stress too much the point that in

modern war, transportation is a factor to be given ever greater
Admiral Baurenschmidt is Deputy Chief, Bureau of Supplies and Accounts.

· RESTRICTED
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 1950

31
33

Naval War College Review, Vol. 3 [1950], No. 4, Art. 1

RESTRICTED
consideration for its importance; cost, and.effect grow 'and grow. as
new techniques of war develop. The soldier of Caesar's Legions
furnished his own transportation and lived off the land, but in the
intervening 2000 years since the days of t,hese Legions, such things .
as gun powder, petroleum, feeding habits and spare parts have
made transportation a matter of grave concern· to the military
leader.

Transportation is a chain of many links including the actual
media of movement such as trucks, trains, planes and ships, and
including terminals, ports, landing fields and storage facilities. In
time of war, or any other time of maximum utilization of trans
portation, all links of this chain must be of equal strength. Thus

the capacity of railroad cars serving a port must be matched by
port capacity, ship capacity, and finally capacity at the terminal
at the other end of the overseas haul. A bottleneck anywhere re
duces the efficiency of the whole. The result of imbalance was con
spicuous in the First World War when there w�s an actual back
ing up of 200,000 loaded freight cars at New York because of in
sufficient port facilities and vessels capacity. To give you some
idea as to what 200,000 freight cars constitute in the way of a
block to traffic, they jam the facilities of the railroads from New

York all· the way back to Pittsburgh.

Proper balance between

the links of transportation can be maintained in some pa� by the
carrier operators, but by far the greater agent in maintaining this

balance is good traffic management.

The Second World War shows that much has been learned

from the lessons of the first great war.

There were no serious

breakdowns in transportation even though imbalances did exist,
and to show you that imbalance did· exist and in part to indicate

how they weretaken care of, I can state that Navy material await

ing transportation across the Pacific was backed . up for want of
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shipping, backed up as far as Illinois, but the effect of this back
up on transportation was kept to a minimum by the expedient of
retaining the material in warehouses. In other words whenever
it became apparent that the material could not be moved forward
beyond a certain point, it was placed in warehouses until it could
move forward and so the Navy operated warehouses from San
Francisco to Illinois.
Just as there were lessons to be learned from the First
World War so are there lessons to be learned from the Second.
Two of these are : first, there is a need for more intelligent use of
port facilities, and second, there is a need for the use of more
ports with less emphasis on the large ports. Under the National
Security Resources Board there is an agency studying the Na
tion's needs for transportation in the next war and the means to
best satisfy those needs. This agency, come the next war, will
probably be the successor to the Office of Defense Transportation,
which operated in the last war. The name of this agency is Of
fice of Transportation and Storage. It is planning port-utilization
now and has established rules and an organization, which should do
much to promote maximum port utilization. In the last war we
shipped most of our cargo through the East Coast ports of New
York, Norfolk, Boston and Philadelphia, and through the West
Coast ports of San Francisco, San Pedro, Seattle, and Port
Hueneme. The disadvantages of this type of operation are self
apparent. First, such concentration of war material and transporta
tion facilities offers excellent targets in the age of atomic warfare.
It also narrows the hunting fields of the wolf packs of submarines.
Just as important as the first two is the fact that this restrictive
use of the Nation's port facilities overtaxes the ones that are used,
the railroads that serve them, while leaving comparatively idle
many smaller ports and the railroads serving them. It is the
Navy's intention, and I have been assured that it is the intention
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In other words, it is not merely sufficient that he balance the charges
of one carrier against those of another but he must also include such
items as the cost of packaging required for each mode of travel,
and such items as stevedoring. When using premium transporta
tion to achieve speed, he must not only weigh need against cost,
but he must provide for, or insure that, his package is transferred
to a more reliable but slower means of conveyance whenever the
premium type carrier is unable to perform.
The matter of cost of transportation is not the simple one
of inquiring of each carrier what he will charge to haul a specific
load of freight. The tariff structure is complicated and a rather
wide field for negotiation even though rates have been published.
The Armed Services have been subjected to a fair amount of criti
cism because they failed to negotiate in transit rates for tre
mendous amounts of material moved during the recent war. I can
describe an in transit rate somewhat in this fashion. Short hauls
cost more per mile than do long ones, but when material is des
tined to make a long haul, which is interrupted, the carrier may
legally charge the short haul rate, but the user may demand and
get the long haul rate.
Suppose, for example, Mechanicsburg is shipping engine
parts to San Francisco, but these parts should be added to other
parts at Clearfield to form full kits. If the Navy claims in transit
privileges it may ship the parts to Clearfield where Clearfield
works on them for several weeks and then sends them on in kits to
San Francisco. The Navy may claim through rates for the parts
from Mechanicsburg to Clearfield and for that portion of the ship
ment from Clearfield to San Francisco which represents the origi
nal parts. Involved also in the matter of rates is the commodity
classification. Rates have been established for each commodity. It
is incumbent upon the shipper to designate his shipment as falling in
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that commodity group which is both appropriate and carrying
the minimum rate. To illustrate this point, I cite the case of the
man who went to the cereal manufacturer and stated that he could

save him large sums of money. The manufacturer was skeptical
but finally entered into a contract which proved to be lucrative to
both the manufacturer and the man. The man's proposal was
that the manufacturer stop calling his product the shredded wheat
biscuits and merely call it shredded wheat, because under the first

.name the product took the tariff for bakery products since it was
called a biscuit, while under the second name it took the much lower
tariff for cereals. The services have been criticized for failing to
take advantage during the recent war of in transit privileges and
proper commodity classification. It is true that leisurely analysis
after the war can show that a billion dollars could have been saved
by better traffic management but so can every Monday-morning
quarterback prove to you how last Saturday's game could have been
better played.

Traffic management has been defined many times. I shall
give you a definition which may be over-simplified, but which focuses

attention upon its salient features. Traffic management is the
science of procuring for the shipper the cheapest possible transporta
tion consistent with delivery requirements in times of· peace, and,

especially in time of war, securing the greatest and most effective
utilization of carrier capacity.
This appears to be the age of centralization in government,

and that in spite of the fact that almost a generation ago big busi

ness found that over-centralization was costly, and big business

has long since decentralized in many areas. We·are urged today to

centralize under one head all transportation controls in the Navy.
Then to centralize under one head all transportation controls for the

Army, Navy and the Air Force. And finally, we. are .told to central-
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ize under one head all transportation controls for the Department

of Defense and for all other Government departments. And yet
during the recent war both the Army and Navy found it necessary
to decentralize their transportation controls to agencies in the field.
Some concentration is indicated.

to be seen.

How much there will be remains

As of the moment there has been formed a Central

Military Land Traffic Office to perform under the administration
of the Army certain functions which the Army, Navy and Air
Force were mutually agreed could be centrally performed and yet

leave to each of the three departments those functions of traffic
management which each of the three services at present believe
essential to its own adequate operation. Some of these functions
are: (a) Negotiation of rates and charges on after-the-fact ship
ments, (b) Issuance of freight classification guides, (c) Negotia
tion of rates and average demurrage agreements, (d) Issuance of
export release permits under conditions of war or emergency only,
(e) Exchange of information as to availability of service-owned
equipment to promote maximum use, (f) Operation of freight

consolidating and distributing stations if and when established by
mutual agreement in times of war or emergency. To the functions
assigned to the Central Military Land Traffic Office can be added
other functions when the three departments are satisfied that it
is appropriate to lodge them there. Should the departments feel

that any of the present functions are improperly lodged in that
Office, they may be removed and restored to the several depart
ments. So far the operation of this central office appears to be
satisfying all three services. Further, it is hoped that by the im
provement in their operations the three departments may satisfy
the General Services Administration and other agencies of the Gov
ernment that it will be unnecessary to centralize any traffic manage
ment of the three military departments in any other agency of the
government.

The three military departments are already of the

opinion that it would be unwise so to do.
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Just as there are some in the government who are clamor
ing for centralization and more centralization, so are there those
who within the Department of Defense advocate that transportation
be divided between its three major media and assigned to the three
departments. Under this concept the Department of the Army
would budget for and operate all land transportation, while the De
partment of the Navy would budget for and operate all sea trans
portation, and the Department of the Air Force would perform sim
ilar functions for all air transportation. This theory, like many
another theory before it, sounds very attractive and plausible.
Those who advocate it persuade many, but never do they persuade
one who has a sound comprehension of traffic management. There
are many sound arguments against this compartmentation or frag
mentation of traffic management. I can illustrate the general tenor
of most of them by stating that it is essential that one brain or
group of brains direct the routing of a single shipment from its
point or origin to its final destination. Let us assume that traffic
management has been fragmented into its three components. Let
us consider a single shipment that involves only land and sea trans
port. And let us suppose that this shipment originates in Ohio and
is destined for Tokyo. First it falls into the hands of the land
transportation traffic manager. He is interested in getting this
shipment to tide water and off his hands in the minimum time and
at the minimum cost. He, therefore, routes it from Ohio to Hamp
ton Roads. This does not suit the sea transport people for it in
volves the long haul from Hampton Roads through the Canal and
out to Tokyo. The sea transport people would much prefer that
the shipment be consigned to San Francisco where they can pick it
up and carry it to T'okyo for the cheapest rates and in the shortest
time. If, however, a single brain is planning the movement from
its point of origin to its destination, this brain might well balance
all time and all costs and arrive at the solution that the cheapest
over-all routing within the allowed time would be to ship by rail
38
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from Ohio to New Orleans, and by sea from New Orleans through
the Canal to Tokyo.

There are similar arguments predicated upon

problems involved.

The operation of sea transport has been as:.

the use of premium transportation and others upon the budgetary

signed to the Navy, and the operation of MATS has been assigned

to the Air Force. · Regretably there are no major land carriers
which are owned by the Department of Defense and the operation
of which could be assigned to the Army.

though the Army has been short changed.

It, therefore, looks as
Unless I have missed

some important point the probability is that within a very few
years the Army will find that it has gained rather than lost in this
assignment for it looks very much as though the Navy will ulti

mately be required to assume budgetary responsibility for MSTS
and the Air Force a similar responsibility for MATS leaving the

Army unburdened with any similar responsibility since all three

services are required to budget for their land transportation. Those

who advocate fragmentation of transportation do so because they
mistake carrier operation for traffic management.

It is the first

which has been assigned and not the second and there is no direct

relationship between the two.

Unfortunately it is not only those

who cannot differentiate between carrier operation and traffic man

agement who are advocating this fragmentation.

There is also a

group of people who would expand their own empire.
finger at no one department.

I point the

All three have their empire builders

in the fields of transportation.

It is perfectly true that in assigning carrier operations to

the Navy and to the Air Force certain traffic management functions
have gone to those two services incident to this assignment.

These

traffic management functions are essentially those of routing once
the cargo has been made available to the carrier.

In the case of

MATS this is of little significance in view of the fact that the

charter of private planes has been reassigned by MATS to the
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three departments, MATS only retaining clearance to be sure that

chartered planes are used to maximum capacity. In the case of
MSTS the three departments, as shippers, have the right to lay

down their cargo at any port they choose. From there on it be
comes the responsibility of MSTS to deliver the cargo to its over
seas destination and in the time specified. MSTS has the choice of

using ships of its own or of using commercial bottoms. Those who

advocate this system say that, in effect, MSTS has embraced all
ocean carriers and, in effect, there is only one carrier. Hence,
routing is a matter of little, if any, concern to the shipper. I, for
one, do not agree with this and am actively advocating that the
three departments each pay for their cargo which is shipped in
commercial bottoms at tariff rates and that they retain the right

to specify that their cargo shall go by such shipments and on such
ships as they select with MSTS merely negotiating the contract
for the lift. If this is done, each service will have retained all that

is essential in traffic management.

Incident to the effect of unification on military transporta
tion the question of priorities in traffic management has received
considerable notice and to date there is no generally agreed upon

policy with regard to priorities. Since priorities in many instances
determine the sequence of shipment and in other cases result in

premium transportation, it is obvious that there is need for an ac
cepted policy with regard to them. One school of thought advo

cates priorities predicated upon categories of material. Under this
concept, for example, bullets might always precede beans, and
beans always precede general stores. It may be perfectly true that
under normal conditions, ammunition is more important than food,

and food is more important than general stores, but this is not al

ways so and we come to the belief of the second group who main

tain that priorities are predicated upon need and not upon cate

gories. Why should ammunition, they say, always come first when
40
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you may have plenty of ammunition and not enough food? Or why
should ammunition and food both come ahead of general stores
when you may have plenty of ammunition and food and be in dire
need of general stores? So they say that priorities are predicated
Upon need and further that only the shipper, or the owner and user
of the material, can determine need. This issue I hope to see
settled in the very near future and settled by the establishment of
the policy that need determine priority.
No discussion of traffic management would be complete
without consideration of the newest medium of transportation,
namely, air lift, and on no subject in the field of transportation is
their wider divergence of opinion, than there is on the matter of
air lift. First, we have those who advocate it because they believe
in anything pertaining to air, and those who oppose it because they
have never been satisfied that the airplane is here to stay. There
are those who distort the incomplete statistics of air lift during the
war to prove any point of view they may happen to take, but air lift
is here and it is here to stay. The question to be answered is, to
what extent can it be relied upon and how can it best be used. The
statistics of the last war are really of little help. First, few sta
tistics w�re collected because people were more interested in getting·
the job done than in recording what it took to get it done. Next,
air lift just grew and it grew in an unplanned but surprisingly rapid
fashion. And, third, there were many flagrant misuses of air lift,
some through lack of understanding of its potentiality and of its
cost and some through downright selfishness. There are many of
us who operated in overseas supply fields during the war who re
member. being denied air lift for vitally needed supplies only to
find that the next incoming plane was loaded with a mahogany bar
and slot machines for some air :field being established, or with
wolf bait for some VIPs in the big cities of the ETO. Be that as
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it may, the recent war convinced us that air lift was a factor in
modern logistics.
As of the present our approach to air lift is not too intelli
gent and our thinking on that score can be illustrated by the con
clusions reached by a certain clergyman who found himself con
fronted by a couple desiring to be united in matrimony. Their ap
pearance led him to inquire of the groom his age, and when the
response came forth, "75," the clergyman asked "and why, sir, do
you desire to be married?" The prospective groom said "Because
I want an heir." The clergyman then turned to the prospective
bride and asked her age. When told that she was 68, he asked her
why she wanted to be married, and she said that she too wanted
an heir. This led the clergyman to come to the conclusion that
the couple were "heir-minded," but not "heir-conditioned." And
so it is with our thinking. We are air minded but not air conditioned.
We ship by air in part as an attempt to make up for mistakes in
planning. We ship by air because we know that air travel is fast.
We have yet to analyze our air lift and find out to what degree it
is dependable, when air cargo is grounded how rapidly can we move
the cargo to other means of travel, what is the true cost of air lift,
what actual saving in time can be counted upon and what categories
of material are best suited for air lift? When we have the answers
to these questions and we apply them properly, air lift will be on a
much firmer and more satisfactory footing.
The true cost of our military air lift today is staggering.
The reliability is very low. The average time saved is very little,
but if we take the time to do some research, we will find our present
cost of military air lift well worth while, and when I speak of re
search I am speaking of research in the actual operation of a
carrier service and in the actual traffic management which accom
panies it. I am not one of those who believe that in the next war
42
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we can dispense with supply depots and we can dispense with ships,
all because everything will be brought by air immediately from the
factory to the consumer's hands. I am one of those who believe
that · substantial quantities of high priority cargo will and must
be transported by air, and to do this satisfactorily we must have

uniform documentation, we must have a route pattern to serve the
customer's needs, operational performance must be measured in
· terms of customer satisfaction not in terms of pilot satisfaction.
Parenthetically I define pilot satisfaction as on;..time departures plus
flight safety plus a high degree of aircraft utilization and similar
factors. And, :finally, we must have some rules qf thumb by which
we can readily determine when the expenditure of fuel and the use
of expensive equipment involved in air lift are warranted. In other
words we must know when we should ship by air and when we
should not ship by air. We need cargo aircraft designed for spec
ific ranges and specific loading and discharge conditions. In short
what I have said about air lift is that it is an infant, a lusty in
fant it is true, but nevertheless an infant.

Many of the schemes to achieve economy, which have been
presented to the Department of Defense in the name of unification,
would be perfectly sound if the Department of Defense were a busi

ness, the objective of which was to show� profit. But when they de
crease.the effectiveness of the Department of Defense as a military
organization, they are without merit and definitely detrimental. The
flaw in many of the schemes pertaining to logistics lies in the fact
that all areas of logistics must be responsive and responsible to the
tactical and strategical commanders, and these schemes do not recog
nize this fact. Transportation, being one of the components of logis
tics, must be also responsive and responsible to command. This is true
in peace of traffic management and in war it is true of both carrier
operations and traffic management. It is for this reason that I stated
earlier that the three military departments are already of the opin
ion that it would be unwise to centralize the traffic management of
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the three military departments in any other agency of the Govern..
ment. This is also the reason why each of the three military de
partments in establishing the Central Military Land Transportation
Office reserved unto themselves the most important functions of
traffic management. It is a self-evident fact that the efforts of the
strategists and of the tactician are of no avail even though with
the utmost brilliance they bring their forces to bear at the critical
point and at the crucial time if those forces are without reserves
and without supplies. The military commander must have as
surance that his reserves of personnel and his requirements for
supplies are delivered to him when and where he wants them, as
well as in the quantities that he requires. It is transportation
which gives time-place utility to material and per�onnel. !tis time-
place utility that the commander requires. He must be complete
ly sure, therefore, of his transportation and in order to be com;.
pletely sure his transportation must be a component of his com
mand subject to his will.
During the recent war the Army established a Transporta
tion Corps. It was the mission of this Corps both to operate carrier
services on land and sea and to act as traffic manager for the ma
terial and personnel of the Army when in transit. The people who
constitute this Corps are exceptionally able in their field. The job
they did during the war was outstanding, but having moved abroad,
returned to the United States and then moved elsewhere abroad fab
ulous quantities of material and tremendous numbers of persons,
these people made the mistake of believing that they were operating
a distribution system, particularly with respect to supplies, and
since the war ended they have spent a great deal of time developing
what they call the "factory-to-soldier program." They are excellent.
traffic managers and I have pointed out that traffic management
requires skilled technicians in a highly complex field, but they have
overlooked the fact that the control of the distribution of material
44
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requires just as highly trained technicians in a field quite as com
plex and possibly more extensive. Careful analysis will show that
traffic management is a tool of supply just as carrier operations are
a tool of traffic management.

In summation I wish to stress the following points:
(1) Transportation is a large part of logistics, and logistics,
according to Field Marshal Montgomery, is 85% of modern war.
(2) Transportation is a function of command.
(3) Transportation is a chain, and in times of maximum use its

links should be of equal strength.

(4) The traffic manager must be a highly trained and skillful

technician for traffic management is very complex indeed.

(5) Effectiveness being the all important criterion of a military
machine, consolidations predicated upon economy without effective

ness are fatal.

(6) The shipper should be able to exact from the carrier the
service he requires and the services of the carrier should be

predicated upon the needs of the shipper and not upon the con
venience of the carrier.
(7) In modern traffic management air lift should be neither

over-emphasized nor ignored.
be watched and stimulated.

It is an infant whose growth should

(8) Transportation is a tool of supply, not the director of

supply.

(9) Finally, I offer the point that the logistician must have a

real appreciation of traffic management, but he should not attempt

to be a traffic manager. The man who defends himself in court has

a fool for a client, and the logistician who does his own traffic
management is no logistician.
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This section lists material published in current periodicals
which will be of interest and value to Navy officers.

"I Sta/,ked Submarines With Our Hunter-Killers''

by W. J. Holt, Jr. Saturday Evening Post.

March 11.

"Bargain in Turkey-Here's One Place We've Spent Our Money Well"
by Hal Lehrman. Fortune. March

"We Are Losing Asia Fast"

by Stewart Alsop. Saturday Evening Post. March 11.

"Air Power and the German War Economy"

by James A. Huston. Marine Corps Gazette. March.

"Industrial Mobilization Planning"

by RADM. D. H. Clark, USN

"Naval Research and Development in World War II"

by RADM. Julius A. Furer, USN (Ret.)
Journal of the American Society of Naval Engineers,
Inc., February.

"ls War With Russia Inevitable?"

by George F. Kennan. Reader's Digest.

March.

"Prescription for Survival"

by Raymond Swing. The Nation. February 18.

The Facts of Diplomatic Recognition"

11

by Clyde Eagleton. New Republic. March 6.

"Report

on Italy"

by Hans Kohn. Current History. February.

1

The Hydrogen Bomb"

by Louis N. Ridenour. Scientific American. March.

"I Was There''

by Fleet Admiral Wilijam Leahy, USN. The Saturday Evening
Post. (Part 1 of 5 Parts) February 25.

"Defense: How We Stack Up Against Russia"

by the Editors of Newsweek. Newsweek. March 13
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